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Summary 
The duty of disclosure is a system of rules applied during the period up until 
an insurance policy is concluded. In order to ascertain that the insurer gets 
all the information he needs to properly evaluate the risk, the prospective 
assured is under a duty to disclose all material circumstances regarding the 
risk. This duty has caused a great number of lawsuits in the UK, while there 
have hardly been any litigation on the matter in the Nordic countries. This 
thesis will highlight the main differences in the duty of disclosure in marine 
insurance, between the Nordic and the UK legal systems. As the Norwegian 
Marine Insurance Plan has transformed into a Nordic Marine Insurance 
Plan, many of the Marine Insurance Acts in common law countries are 
going under its first revisions in a hundred years and there will be a 
discussion on the likely development within the coming few years.  
 
Initially, the thesis will provide an overview of the UK Marine Insurance 
Act, 1906 and the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013. The reader will be 
given a brief summary of the two sets of rules and how they have 
developed. Following the introductory chapters, there will be a more 
detailed description of how the duty of disclosure is regulated, and what the 
main differences are between the UK and the Nordic approach. As will be 
demonstrated, the UK system is more insurer friendly than its Nordic 
counterpart. Furthermore, the remedy system under the UK Act is more 
rigid and may come out harsh on an assured who has failed to fulfil his 
duties. These, among others, are the differences that will be discussed for 
the purpose of the comparative analysis. The final part of the thesis will 
provide some examples of what the UK Law Commission has pointed out as 
areas in need of modification. Among the conclusions can be mentioned the 
lack of balance in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, that are giving the 
insurers an incentive to claim breach of pre-contractual duties. This might 
be one of the main reasons to the high number of litigation mentioned 
above. 
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Sammanfattning 
Upplysningsplikten ålägger den som vill teckna försäkring att förse 
försäkringsbolaget med relevant information rörande risken. Anledningen 
till att en sådan skyldighet finns är att den typen av information i många fall 
finns hos den som vill teckna försäkring.  Upplysningsplikten har varit 
orsaken till en stor mängd domstolsprövningar i Storbritannien medan den i 
de nordiska länderna knappt har varit uppe till prövning. Syftet med den här 
uppsatsen är att belysa de viktigaste skillnaderna mellan Storbritanniens och 
Nordens rättsystem när det gäller upplysningsplikten i marina 
försäkringsavtal. Medan den Norska Sjöförsäkringsplanen har förvandlats 
till en Nordisk Sjöförsäkringsplan, genomgår de marina 
försäkringsavtalslagarna i många common law system sina första revisioner 
på etthundra år. Den pågående utvecklingen kommer att diskuteras och 
kommenteras i denna uppsatts.  
 
Inledningsvis kommer den brittiska Marine Insurance Act, 1906 och den 
Nordiska Sjöförsäkringsplanen av 2013 att beskrivas. En historisk bakgrund 
följs av en kort översikt över de två regelverken. Därefter kommer en mer 
ingående beskrivning av hur reglerna kring upplysninsplikten är utformade 
och de två regelverkens skillnader och likheter kommer att illustreras. Det 
kommer här bli tydligt att de brittiska reglerna är mer gynsamma för 
försäkringsbolagen och kan i vissa fall ålägga försäkringstagaren nästan 
orimliga konsekvenser vid brott mot upplysningsplikten. Detta är några av 
de skillnaderna som diskuteras i den jämförande analysen.  
 
Avslutningsvis kommer läsaren få en kortare introduktion till de 
förändringar som den brittiska Law Commission har pekat ut som de 
viktigaste att genomföra. Bland slutsatserna märks bland annat hur de 
fördelar som den brittiska lagstiftningen innebär för försäkringsbolagen kan 
vara en starkt bidragande orsak till den stora mängden domstolsfall som har 
observerats.  
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Preface 
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List of Abbreviations 
Cefor  Sjøassurandørernes Centralforening 
(The Central Union of Marine 
Underwriters). From 2009 renamed 
The Nordic Association of Marine 
Insurers but normally related to as 
Cefor 
 
CMI Committe Maritime International 
 
MIA, 1906 The UK Marine Insurance Act, 
1906 
 
MIA, 1909 The Australian Marine Insurance 
Act, 1909 
 
NMIP Nordic Marine Insurance Plan, 
2013 
 
P&I  Protection & Indemnity  
 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The parties entering into an insurance contract generally face certain 
problems that normally are not present during pre-contractual negotiations 
of ordinary contracts. The relevant information relating to the object of the 
contract, namely the risk, is primarily in the hands of the assured and the 
insurer needs this information in order to assess the risk. This information 
forms the foundation upon which the insurer can decide whether or not to 
enter into the contract, to what premium and on what conditions. Thus, the 
assured needs to hand over information regarding the risk to the insurer for 
the insurer’s evaluation. With sufficient information at hand, the insurer 
may use his professional skills as a risk analyst and present a position on 
what the terms of the contract should be. When the risk is clarified, the 
negotiations can begin. The assured’s duty to provide the insurer with 
information about the risk is part of the mutual duty of disclosure. This is 
the legislative solution to the problem.  
 
In the following section, a particular case will be presented to indicate how 
the market operates. A shipowner, with a good track record when it comes 
to damage, approaches an insurer to enter into a Hull and Machinery 
contract. According to the duty of disclosure, the shipowner is obliged to 
provide the insurer with material circumstances regarding the risk. 
However, in practice the insurer will retrieve information about the ship and 
its management from various sources. In the experience of the author, an 
insurer will find the vast majority of the material circumstances for 
evaluating the risk in registers and in the public domain. Classification 
societies have all the relevant details concerning the ship, its construction 
and maintenance. The insurer knows exactly what information he needs to 
evaluate the risk and for several reasons he is eager to retrieve it himself. A 
ship is a high value asset and the potential loss if the insurer fails to evaluate 
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the risk correctly is immense. Another reason why he is willing to do the 
work himself is stiff competition in the insurance market.  
 
According to Marsh Insights: Marine Market Monitor of July 2012
1
, there is 
an overcapacity in the insurance market, which keep the premiums low. 
According to statistics presented by senior lecturer Cathrine Bjune at the 
Norwegian Business School in a public seminar on the 8
th
 of March 2012 
(BI), hull underwriters, as a community, have not made technical profit on 
pure hull insurance for over 16 years.
2
  
 
Given these circumstances and that we are dealing with a shipowner with a 
low damage ratio the following fictional scenario may be considered. When 
the contract is concluded, the shipowner only communicates the most basic 
circumstances about the risk, and the underwriter only asks for whatever 
information he needs to complete the necessary inquiries. The shipowner is 
in a favourable situation and the insurer sees no point in bothering the 
shipowner if it is not necessary. During the insurance period, the machinery 
of the ship suffers a breakdown and the assured approaches the insurer for 
compensation under the policy. It later turns out that there was a change of 
flag before the contract was concluded and that the underwriter did not 
know about this circumstance.  
 
This thesis will examine the duty of disclosure in the UK Marine Insurance 
Act 1906
3
 and the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan 2013
4
. There will be a 
focus on highlighting the issues brought up by the fictional scenario above. 
These issues will be answered in a broader sentence through the questions 
presented in the purpose. 
                                                 
1
 Marsh & McLennan is one of the largest insurance brokerage firms.  
http://uk.marsh.com/Portals/18/Documents/MMM_Issue1_2012.pdf.  
2
http://www.cee.ntu.edu.sg/Events/Documents/Maritime%20Events/8Mar12/Presentation_
Cathrine%20Bjune.pdf.  
3
 Marine Insurance Act 1906 c. 41 (Regnal. 6_Edw_7). Henceforward referred to as MIA, 
1906. See supplement A.  
4
 The Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013 – based on the Norwegian Marine Insurance 
Plan of 1996, Version 2010. Henceforward referred to as NMIP of the PLAN. See 
supplement B. 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to critically evaluate the duty of disclosure in 
marine insurance law. The differences and similarities in this aspect 
between the English MIA, 1906 and the NMIP will for this purpose be 
examined. Finally, the recent development in this area will be presented and 
commented. 
 
The questions that this thesis will focus on are  
- What is the need and rationale for the duty of disclosure in marine 
insurance contracts?  
- How is the duty of disclosure affected by the knowledge of the 
insurer? 
- What significance does the availability of information in the public 
domain, or in various registers accessible for the insurer, have for the 
duty of disclosure? 
- What are the possible reasons to why there have been a significantly 
larger number of lawsuits in England concerning marine insurance 
law than there has been in Norway?  
- How does the warranty system in the MIA, 1906 and the rules of 
alteration of risk in the NMIP work in conjunction with the duty of 
disclosure? 
- How is the duty of disclosure most likely to develop within the 
coming few years?  
 
1.3 Delimitation 
The main focus for this thesis will be the duty of disclosure. The intention is 
not to give a complete presentation, but to give the reader an idea of how the 
duty works in UK and in Nordic law. One of the most significant parts that 
is left out is the one concerning the brokers and agents. In reality, there will 
be plenty more parties involved in the insurance policy than the shipowner 
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and the underwriter. Insurance is often handled by professional brokers who 
have a certain position in the legislation. E.g. Section 19 MIA, 1906 contain 
rules about the broker, and the NMIP consequently refers to “the person 
effecting the insurance” to clarify that this may not be the same as the entity 
in right of compensation under the policy. There may also be co-insured, 
whose cover is affected by how the pre-contractual duties are complied 
with. Matters concerning these parties is not necessary to examine for the 
purpose of this thesis and their legal status will therefore not be further 
commented.  
 
The number of English court cases concerning the doctrine of utmost good 
faith
5
 in general and the duty of disclosure in particular is excessive and this 
part of the MIA, 1906 is thoroughly scrutinised. This thesis will only 
address the general principles and therefore omit the vast majority of these 
cases. What circumstances, covered by the duty of disclosure, is actually 
available for the insurer to retrieve without the participation of the assured? 
This is something that would have been interesting to investigate further, 
but falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Method and material 
The approach of the subject will follow a legal dogmatic and comparative 
method. The applicable law for marine insurance in the UK and in the 
Nordic market will be described, analysed and compared. The focus will lie 
on examining how the duty of disclosure is governed in the two systems and 
how these different approaches are affecting the balance between the parties 
to a marine insurance policy.  The questions mentioned in the purpose of the 
thesis will be answered by analysing the current state of law and the 
suggestions for modification that are being discussed by Law Commissions 
in the UK and in Australia.  
 
                                                 
5
 See section 3.2.1 
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When examining the applicable law in the UK, case law will always have a 
prominent role as being the second most important source of law in the 
common law hierarchy.
6
  Since the MIA, 1906 is a codification of case law, 
the court decisions will be of particular interest while interpreting the Act.
7
 
Not only will marine insurance cases be used, but also other cases referring 
to the MIA, 1906. The rationale is that in many aspects the same rules apply 
to non-marine insurance, as was stated in by Lord Mustill in the House of 
Lords:  
 
Although the issues arise under a policy of non-marine insurance it 
is convenient to state them by reference to the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 since it has been accepted in argument, and is indeed laid down 
in several authorities, that in relevant respects the common law 
relating to the two types of insurance is the same, and that the Act 
embodies a partial codification of the common law.
8
 
 
 
When it comes to the Nordic law, the situation on marine insurance 
is quite unique. The NMIP is in fact a standard contract, but is 
characterized as something more resembling a statute than the 
ordinary standard contract. It has been held that the Plan should be 
interpreted as if it was statute, which in the Nordic jurisdictions 
means that the preparatory work would be given a high status. For 
these reasons, the main source of interpretation of the NMIP will be 
its extensive commentaries.
9
  
 
Authoritative scholarly will be used to supplement the sources 
already mentioned. All literature used for this thesis is written by 
                                                 
6
 In England, the hierarchy is as follows beginning with the highest legal status: Enacted 
legislation, common law (including case law), and authoritative scholarly writing.  
7
 Accordning to the principles of stare decisis, earlier judgements from any court in the 
hierarchy is always considered while deciding on a case. Thus, even very old court 
decisions may still be of great interest and importance to the interpretation if the situation is 
similar. S.f. Bogdan, M., Komparativ Rättskunskap, 2
nd
 ed., Nordstedts Juridik AB, 
Stockholm, 2003, p. 93.  
8
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd. [1995] 1 AC 501 at 518, per 
Lord Mustill. 
9
 The status of the NMIP and its commentaries will be further developed in subchapter 
2.2.2. 
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authors whose expertise on marine law is widely recognized and 
accepted.  
  
To get an idea of how the duty of disclosure might develop in the 
future, the most recent reports from the Law Commissions in 
Australia and the UK will be presented. The Australian perspective 
is relevant as they, in this field, are one step ahead of their UK 
counterpart. These reports also serve as a source of the latest 
developments in the area of marine insurance.  
 
1.5 Structure 
The first part of this thesis, chapter 2, will provide an overview of the MIA, 
1906 and the NMIP, including an historical background. The specific 
provisions relating to the duty of disclosure will also be included in this 
chapter. In chapter 3, these provisions will be further examined, while 
highlighting the differences and similarities between the two systems. This 
chapter will explain how the duty of disclosure is constructed, what may 
constitute a breach and how a breach is sanctioned. Finally in chapter 3, the 
rules concerning changes of the risk during the contract period will be 
presented, as they are in some ways part of the duty of disclosure and also 
delimit the scope of the pre-contractual duties. Chapter 4 contains the 
comparative analysis and presents the Law Commissions suggestions for the 
future. Chapter 5 is where the author’s conclusions and comments will be 
given. The thesis will here be summarized and the questions raised in the 
introduction will be answered.   
 
1.6 Definition of terms 
The term “assured” will relate to the party seeking cover for a risk, i.e. the 
person effecting the insurance, a person entitled to remedy under the 
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insurance or any agent who acts on behalf of any of the two first mentioned. 
The MIA, 1906 uses “assured or his agent” and it thus seems appropriate to 
choose “assured” as a general term. While relating to the “insurer”, the 
author intends to cover the insurance company or anyone acting on its 
behalf.  
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2 Evolution of the law of 
marine insurance in the UK 
and Norway  
In contrast to many other areas of maritime law, there is no international 
convention or model law on marine insurance. Attempts have been made by 
among others the UNCTAD
10
 to unify the law, but the differences in the 
various systems are many. The most recent attempts have been made by the 
CMI
11
 International Working group, which has identified non-disclosure, 
good faith, alteration of risk and warranties as being the most controversial 
areas in the attempts for unification of marine insurance law. However, the 
marine insurance market is global and changes in one set of rules might 
have an impact on the others as they compete with each other. Thus, the 
differences in practice are not as vast as can be projected when first 
contemplating and comparing different rules of marine insurance.  
 
The rules on marine insurance have developed through lex mercatoria
12
. 
Many of the fundamental principles were first defined in England through 
common law during the 18
th
 century. The law established by the courts was 
enacted as the MIA, 1906. In Norway, this field of law has seen most of its 
progress thanks to agreed standard contracts. This was possible as the 
legislation on marine insurance has been, and still is, dispositive. This has 
resulted in an extensive set of rules, more resembling legislation with a 
comprehensive and published commentary to supplement it. In the 
following chapter, the MIA, 1906 and the NMIP will be individually 
                                                 
10
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
11
 Comité Maritime International, a non-governmental, non-profit organisation that works 
for unification of maritime law.  
12
 Law merchant, a system of custom and best practice that evolved among merchants. It 
regulates transactions and the settlement of commercial related disputes. Lex mercatoria 
was generally recognized by courts along trade routes and has in many parts been 
incorporated in modern commercial law.  
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presented and the segments concerning the duty of disclosure will be 
highlighted.  
2.1 The Marine Insurance Act of 1906 
2.1.1 Historical background  
The Act can be described as a reflection of the customs that have developed 
over the centuries since marine insurance was first practised in the UK. 
Most of the common law that creates the foundation of the MIA, 1906 was 
developed during the 18
th
 century. The principles in the MIA, 1906 are to a 
large extent based on cases under Lord Mansfield, who was acting as Lord 
Chief Justice from 1756 - 1788.
13
  
 
Marine insurance was from the beginning, as most matters relating to the 
trade of goods, a part of the medieval lex mercatoria. Disputes were settled 
in local merchants’ tribunals. The proceedings were swift and records from 
this period are scarce. In the 14
th
 century the Court of Admiralty was 
established and began to enter the same jurisdiction as the tribunals. 
However, since few cases reached the Court of Admiralty, this development 
did not change the situation where little material was saved for forthcoming 
cases and therefore the progress of the law was slow.
14
  
 
In the 16
th
 century, as international trade became more and more important 
in England, the government began to take a greater interest in the field of 
marine insurance and the Privy Council
15
 in time established an arbitration 
court to deal with matters of marine insurance. This specialist court, called 
the Court of Commissioners, with its expert members and swift trials did for 
a period attract a substantial part of the lawsuits. The insurers however, 
being the stronger party, had more to benefit from the fact that the 
                                                 
13
 http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/william-murray,-lord-mansfield.  
14
 Bennet, H., The Law of Marine Insurance, 2
nd
 ed., Oxford University Press Inc., New 
York, United States, 2006, p. 14f. 
15
 Administrative body, committee of advisors to the monarch.  
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proceedings of formal litigation were more time-consuming and expensive. 
Thus, they tended to avoid this kind of arbitration in favour of the Admiralty 
Court.
16
   
 
In 1601, petitions from the assured merchants to the Privy Council led to a 
new Act
17
 whereby the legislator sought to steer litigation back to courts of 
arbitration. A new Court of Commissioners was created and judicial as well 
as commercial experts were appointed as Commissioners. Despite attempts 
to meet the requirements of the commercial community and reforms that 
sought to give the court extended powers, it did not endure for the long 
haul.
18
 
 
The case of Came v Moye
19
 among other things stated that judgements 
passed by the Court of Commissioners did not prevent the parties from 
bringing the case to a common law court.
20
 Thus, litigation in matters of 
marine insurance was relocated from a court consisting of experts in the 
relevant fields to the common law courts where knowledge in mercantile 
law was rare. Under these circumstances the potential development of 
mercantile law in general and marine insurance law in particular was 
reduced to a minimum, bare in mind the significance of court rulings in the 
common law system. The result was a great deal of uncertainty concerning 
the rules governing insurance contracts and several common law courts that 
claimed jurisdiction. This negative trend would reach a turning point during 
the second half of the 18
th
 century.
21
  
 
In 1956, William Murray was appointed Chief Justice of the King’s Bench 
and thus peered as Baron Mansfield. Lord Mansfield would become one of 
the most important judges in the field of commercial law, particularly 
marine insurance law. By taking the old law merchant and combining it with 
                                                 
16
 Bennet, H., supra note 10 p. 15. 
17
 Act concerning Matters of Assurances used among Merchants.  
18
 Bennet, H., supra note 10 p. 16. 
19
 (1658) 2 Sid. 121, 82 E.R. 1290. 
20
 Bennet, H., supra note 10, p. 16f. 
21
 Ibid. p.17f. 
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established principles of law, he strived to bring certainty and foreseeability 
into the practice of commercial law. During his time, the faith in the 
common law courts to handle marine insurance law increased; the absence 
of petitions to Parliament for new legislation and the few cases of overruling 
indicated that the market was quite pleased with the development.
22
 
 
The principles developed by the common law courts henceforth ruled in the 
field of marine insurance law. In the late 19
th
 century, Parliment saw it fit to 
codify commercial law. The reason was to reduce litigation by clearly 
stipulating the rules that had been established throughout the centuries. 
Thus, originating from existing practice and jurisprudence, MIA, 1906 is the 
product of some 2,000 cases and was drafted by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers. 
After thorough consideration by a committee, consisting of legislators as 
well as representatives of shipowners, average adjusters and insurers, the 
Bill was passed almost twelve years after it was first introduced in the 
House of Lords in 1894.
23
 The MIA, 1906 does not prevent application of 
the rules of equity
24
 or rules of the common law including the law merchant, 
as long as they are not inconsistent with any express provisions of the Act. 
This follows from section 91(2) MIA, 1906. Even though the wording of the 
MIA, 1906 must be considered as the primary source for interpretation of 
the principles, the Act does not bar the courts from using pre-existing case 
law whenever needed.  As mentioned above, as the Act was drafted it was 
merely a codification of already established common law.
25
  
 
Subsequently, many other common law countries inspired by the MIA, 1906 
created similar legislation
26
 and thus it can be described as the mother of all 
marine statues. The English market dominates the world of marine 
                                                 
22
 Bennet, H., supra note 10, p. 18ff. 
23
 Bennet, H., supra note 10, pp. 20f. 
24
 Equity is a set of rules that gives the courts right to by court orders deviate from common 
law in cases where the strict or technical application of the law would lead to an unfair 
outcome. Typically, the court will order one of the parties to do something or to refrain 
from doing something.  S.f. Bogdan, M., supra note 6, p. 99. 
25
 Bennet, H., supra note 10, p. 22. 
26
 I.e. The Marine Insurance Act, Public Act 1908 No 112 (New Zeeland) and Marine 
Insurance Act, 1909 (Cth) (Australia). 
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insurance and consequently English law, implied or expressly, governs 
much of the world’s marine insurance.  
 
2.1.2 Summary of the MIA, 1906 
The MIA, 1906 consists of 94 sections and deals with all aspects of 
insurance law. As described above, the MIA, 1906 is a codification of 
principles developed in common law mainly during the 18
th
 and the 19
th
 
century. Even though intended for marine insurance, it has come to be used 
for all matters of insurance.  
  
2.1.3 Specific Provisions concerning the Duty 
of Disclosure  
Section 17 MIA, 1906 establishes the concept of utmost good faith for 
insurance contracts and also states the remedy for failing to comply with 
this duty, namely avoidance. The duty is imposed on the parties to the 
contract and it should be made totally clear that this duty is mutual between 
them. While the case law was ambiguous prior to the codification of marine 
insurance law in 1906,
27
 section 17 MIA, 1906 clarifies that avoidance is 
optional to the insurer and the contract does not ipso facto becomes void 
when the duty of utmost good faith has been breached.  
 
With the doctrine of good faith being an extensive concept, section 18 MIA, 
1906 sets out to specify the assured’s part of it as the duty of disclosure. 
Section 18(1) MIA, 1906 relate to the pre-contractual duties; all material 
information known or ought to be known by the assured shall be 
communicated to the insurer before the contract is concluded. Materiality is 
further explained in section 18(2). The determining factor is: would the 
information have any influence on a hypothetical prudent insurer when 
                                                 
27
 Bennet, H., supra note 10, pp. 104-105. 
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considering whether to provide cover and if so, at what premium. Section 
18(3) MIA, 1906 introduces a number of circumstances that the assured 
does not have to disclose, unless the insurer explicitly asks to know them. 
These are circumstances that cannot affect the insurer in any negative way 
because they reduce the risk. It also includes what is, or should be known to 
the insurer. Likewise, circumstances that the insurer has dismissed or 
deemed unnecessary are not considered to be within the scope of the duty of 
disclosure. The same goes for circumstances that are covered by any 
warranty and therefore is not something that the insurer needs to worry 
about for the sake of risk. Section 18 (4) MIA, 1906 states that the question 
of materiality is in each cases a question of fact. Section 18(5) concerns the 
concept of “a circumstance” that is mentioned in section 18(1), MIA 1906. 
Any communication to, or information received by the assured is considered 
a circumstance. Read in conjunction with section 18(1) MIA, 1906 this also 
includes what the assured should know in his ordinary course of business.  
 
Section 20 MIA, 1906 contain specific rules concerning the assured’s 
liability for representations made before the contract is concluded. Rules 
against misrepresentation is part of the doctrine of utmost good faith, as the 
assured is not only obliged to disclose information, but naturally also 
responsible to a certain extent for the accuracy of that information. Thus, 
section 18 and 20 are in many aspects similar to each other. “Although 
disclosure and representation are separately dealt with both in the Marine 
Insurance Act and in this work, there is no hard-and-fast division between 
them.”28.   
Like section 18(1) MIA, 1906, section 20(1) MIA 1906 stipulate that the 
provisions in the section only apply to material circumstances. The 
definition of materiality in section 20(2) MIA 1906 is identical to its 
equivalent in section 18(2) MIA 1906. Representations are divided into two 
groups, viz.: those of facts and those of expectations/beliefs.    
 
                                                 
28
 Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 17th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2008, per Musthill, M.J., and Gilman, J.C.B., p. 706. 
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2.2 The Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan  
2.2.1 Historical Background  
Marine insurance in Norway was first governed by the Maritime Code and 
from 1930, by the Insurance Contract Act (ICA)
29
. However, with both 
legislation consisting mostly of non-mandatory rules in relation to marine 
insurance, standard form contracts has been the main legal source since the 
first one was drafted in 1871. These standard form contracts referred to as 
Marine Insurance Plans, have gained a certain position in the hierarchy of 
rules and legislation and dominates the Nordic marine insurance market.
30
  
 
The ICA §1-3 second paragraph (c) explicitly excludes marine insurance 
from the mandatory part of the ICA. The perception is that shipowners in 
general possess a great deal of experience and knowledge when it comes to 
insurance, thus are not in need of as much protective legislation as the 
average assured. One reason for this is that a ship is not only a high value 
asset, but it is also exposed to many perils of different natures, i.e. there are 
not only many risks to be considered but also the potential loss is immense. 
Therefore, a shipowner is expected to have an organisation to manage the 
ship in a professional way, and part of this management should be 
experienced when it comes to matters of signing insurance policies. 
Furthermore, shipping is an international industry and the competition is 
thus global. That means that the competition for marine insurance is also 
global. As a result the rules must be similar to – or better than the rules in 
other legal systems in order to be competitive. Too diverse or protective a 
legislation would probably result in higher premiums and shipowners would 
look elsewhere for insurance. Perhaps the most obvious reason to exclude 
marine insurance from the mandatory legislation is that there already was an 
effective set of rules in place, namely the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan. 
                                                 
29
 Insurance Contracts Act of 16 June 1989 (no 69). 
30
 Falkanger, T., Bull, H. J., and Brautaset, L., Scandinavian Maritime Law, 3
rd
 ed., 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2011, pp. 516-517. 
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As the market players had already agreed on a standard contract, there was 
no need for a new law to replace it.
31
  
 
The Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan dates back to 1871 when it was first 
drafted. Scandinavia is often claimed to have a strong tradition of striving 
for consensus and this document can be described as part of that tradition. 
The NMIP together with its commentaries has from the very beginning been 
an agreed document, established by representatives for the shipowners and 
the insurance companies.
32
  
 
Since the very beginning, it has been crucial to have a set of rules that 
corresponds with and is competitive to the ones found in the international 
market, a market dominated by English Law. Thus, there are many 
similarities to be found between the two systems. The Plan has been under 
consistent review and some major revisions have been made to keep it up-
to-date with the needs and demands of the market.  
 
In October 2012 the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan was presented. The 
introduction of the Nordic Plan does not exactly turn the tables as its rules 
were already used in the Nordic insurance market through the Norwegian 
Plan, from which it originates. In the official name, the words “Based on the 
Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan of 1996, Version 2010” is incorporated 
to clarify that it is basically the same plan with a different name and the only 
major difference is that it is now explicitly sanctioned by representatives 
from the other Nordic countries as well. No major changes have been 
necessary for the purpose of harmonization.  
2.2.2 Summary of the NMIP 
The NMIP has three features that defines it and sets out its legal status. To 
begin with, one must be aware that the plan, despite its appearance, is a 
                                                 
31
 Wilhelmsen, T.-L. and Bull, H. J., Handbook in Hull Insurance, 1
st
 ed., Gyldendal Norsk 
Forlag AS, Oslo, 2007 pp. 27-28. 
32
 Falkanger, T., Bull, H. J., and Brautaset, L., supra note 27, pp. 516-517. 
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standard form contract. However, the construction is more similar to 
legislation than an ordinary standard contract and in its former shape, it 
covered the whole scope of marine insurance.
33
  
 
The NMIP provides complete regulation within its areas of application, 
which in the latest edition is all shipowners insurances, except from P&I
34
 
insurance that was excluded in the 1996 version.
35
  
 
Secondly, the NMIP is an agreed document, which means that every group 
with an interest in the document has through representatives participated 
upon its construction and revision. With the shipowners, insurers and 
average adjusters all taking part in the constitution the document becomes 
balanced and receives widespread acceptance. This committee meets 
through the Nordic Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor
36
) and is chaired 
by a representative of The Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law.
37
 
Thirdly, the notes from the discussion form a kind of preparatory work for 
the NMIP and are published as commentaries. These commentaries are 
incorporated as a part of the agreed document and reveal the thoughts of the 
authors. This is expressed in the commentaries to § 1-4, and the 
commentary continues by claiming that it should be given a high status 
when interpreting the NMIP. The Norwegian Supreme Court has in the case 
of NSC Ocean Blessing
38
 given affirmation to this by declaring that they 
approve the commentary’s definition of its own importance. This was 
further confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of NSC Brødrene 
Prøve
39
. Other court decisions (NA Stolt Condor
40
 and NSC Hardhaus
41
) 
                                                 
33
 See subchapter 2.2.1 above. 
34
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35
 Wilhelmsen, T.-L. and Bull, H. J., supra note 28, pp. 28-29. 
36
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have indicated how the wording of the commentary should be weighted. 
The conclusion of these two cases is that the commentary must be 
considered as explanations to the rules and only relevant in the parts that 
actually develop the specific solutions of the Plan. The more general 
discussions in the commentary must be treated as equal to other doctrine on 
the area. Conclusively, the commentary has indisputably been established to 
constitute a part of the NMIP as an agreed document and as such, an 
important tool for interpreting the NMIP, as long as they concern the 
specific solutions presented in the Plan.
42
  
 
 
2.2.3 Specific Provisions concerning the Duty 
of Disclosure  
The rules of the NMIP concerning the duty of disclosure are found in 
chapter 3 section 1. They are based on the idea that the assured is a 
professional and thus the responsibilities of this person goes further than in 
a normal insurance contract.  
 
§ 3-1 imposes on the assured to provide the insurer with all the information 
needed in order to evaluate the risk before signing the contract. The 
paragraph also states that the assured must report to the insurer if, after 
signing the contract, it comes to his knowledge that information is incorrect 
or incomplete.  
 
§§ 3-2 to 3-4 deals with the remedies when failing to fulfil the duty of 
disclosure. Unlike the MIA, 1906, the Plan has different remedies 
depending on the culpability of the breach.  
 
If the breach is fraudulent, the insurer is not bound by the contract in 
question, according to §3-2 first subparagraph. He is also in his right to 
                                                 
42
 Wilhelmsen, T.-L. and Bull, H. J., supra note 28, pp. 29-30. 
 22 
cancel any other insurance contract he may have with the assured by giving 
fourteen days’ notice. This sanction, which is found in § 3-2 second 
subparagraph goes beyond the one available under the MIA, 1906 by 
involving the entire insurance relationship.  
 
If, on the other side the breach is not blameworthy, §3-4 stipulates that the 
contract will remain in force but the insurer may cancel the insurance by 
giving fourteen days notice. The assured who makes an innocent mistake 
will thus not face the risk of losing his insurance cover on the spot, which 
would be a rather harsh consequence, but is instead given at least fourteen 
days to sign a new insurance. The insurer on the other hand will have to 
accept a potentially higher risk than he had intended, but for a maximum of 
fourteen days. He may also use the right of cancellation as leverage to bring 
about a re-negotiation of the contract terms with the assured.   
 
Any other failure to fulfil the duty of disclosure will be dealt with under § 3-
3. In these cases the consequence of failure will depend on the materiality of 
the circumstances not disclosed to the insurer, i.e. in which case full 
disclosure would have influenced the insurer’s judgement of the risk and his 
decisions regarding the contract. If the answer is that he would not have 
taken on the risk at all, he may cancel the contract. If, however, he would 
have taken on the risk but on other conditions, the liability is limited to 
losses that have no connection to the circumstances not disclosed. In other 
words, the insurer is released from liability for those risks that he was not 
fully informed about. The same applies to the situation where the assured 
has come to know that incorrect or incomplete information was given about 
the risk at the time the contract was formed, but has failed to notify the 
insurer about this. The insurer may, as in the event of innocent breach, 
cancel the contract by giving fourteen days notice.  
 
§ 3-6 is a statue of limitation that imposes obligation on the insurer to 
immediately inform the assured if he discovers a breach of the duty of 
disclosure and intends to invoke the remedy rules.  
 23 
 
Most of the information regarding the ship can be obtained from the 
classification society and § 3-7 gives the insurer the right to collect these 
facts from the assured or directly from the classification society. The insurer 
thus has direct accessibility to basically all he needs to know about the 
condition of the ship. If the assured do not oblige with this, the insurer will 
have the right to cancel the insurance by giving fourteen days notice. 
However, in this case the ship has to be able to reach a safe port before the 
insurance can cease to be effective.  
 24 
3 A Comparative study of the 
Duty of Disclosure under UK 
and Nordic Marine Insurance 
Law 
3.1 Carectaristics of an Insurance 
Contract and the Principle of 
Equivalence  
The subject of the insurance contract is risk. The assured seeks to minimize 
his own financial risk in case of casualty and the insurer takes on the risk for 
a monetary consideration, the premium. Thus the insurer wishes to know as 
much as possible about the risk in order to reduce the uncertainty, while the 
assured wants to get maximum protection at a low premium.  
 
The meaning of the principle of equivalence is that the two parties to a 
contract should have a reasonable opportunity to retrieve information about 
the contract interest, which in the insurance contract is the risk, before 
deciding whether to enter the contract and on what terms. In an insurance 
contract, the assured will have considerably better access to specifics 
concerning the risk. The general point of departure is that the assured knows 
basically everything about the object and the risk proposed for insurance 
while the insurer has very limited access to such knowledge. The idea is that 
this imbalance of information must be bridged in order to give both the 
insurer and the assured a fair chance to base their decisions concerning the 
contract on sufficient facts.
43
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 Bennet, H., supra note 10 p. 103. 
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Apart from being a matter of fairness, the duty of disclosure is a matter of 
economic efficiency. By obliging the assured to provide the insurer with 
information, the duty of disclosure gives the insurer a fair chance to assess 
the risk. This creates conditions where the insurer can match the risk to a 
proper premium. This should not be considered a disadvantage for the 
assured, but rather the contrary. If the insurer does not have total insight 
about the risk, he is inclined to charge a higher premium to compensate for 
this and to make sure that he does not charge to little in respect to the risk. 
Another scenario may be that the insurer initiates investigations to clarify all 
the relevant circumstances. This is normally a more expensive solution than 
if the assured had just provided the information and higher costs for the 
insurer will eventually lead to higher premiums. Naturally, each party seeks 
to get as much benefit out of the contract as possible. Nevertheless, one 
must also consider that there is a difference between bargaining for a better 
price, and going so far as to jeopardize the foundations of an efficient 
contract.  
 
3.2 Scope of the Duty of Disclosure 
3.2.1 MIA, 1906 
An insurance contract under the MIA, 1906 is characterised as a contract of 
uberrimae fidei, meaning a contract based on the principal of utmost good 
faith. Lord Mansfield set out this principle in the leading case Carter v 
Boehm
44
 
First. Insurance is a contract upon speculation.  
The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie 
most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only; the under-writer 
trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not 
keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter 
into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to 
estimate the risque, as if it did not exist. 
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 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905, 97 E.R. 1162.  
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The keeping back such circumstance is a fraud, and therefore the policy is 
void.
45
 
 
This statement contains all the fundamental parts of the duty of disclosure: 
The insurer must be able to trust the assured’s representation and the 
assured is required to disclose all relevant circumstances in his knowledge 
regarding the risk.  
 
A contract of any kind is subject to the principle of good faith, meaning that 
one must act honestly but is under no obligation to provide the counterpart 
with information. General contract law has rules against misrepresentation 
i.e., giving false or misleading information that induces someone into a 
contract. The remedy for such breach is avoidance.
46
 
 
The principle of utmost good faith is manifested through the duty of 
disclosure and the duty not to misrepresent. The duty of disclosure is 
defined in section 18 as a duty for the assured to volunteer all facts that 
“may affect the judgment of a prudent insurer”. Consequently, non-
fraudulent misrepresentation is considered a breach of this duty and 
therefore treated as a breach.  
 
The duty of utmost good faith is not contractual but arises before the 
contract itself is formed, as was so held in the case of Banque Keyser 
Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd
47
 with reference to the earlier 
case of Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd.
48
: an obligation cannot be derived from 
the contract if it exists before the actual formation of the contract. 
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3.2.1.1 Knowledge 
The starting point for the scope of the duty of disclosure is whether the 
circumstance is known to the assured. First and foremost it should be 
clarified that the issue of knowledge in the MIA, 1906 concerns only 
knowledge about circumstances, not about whether the circumstance is 
material.
49
 The concept of materiality will be discussed below.  
 
Actual knowledge covers not only what the assured subjectively knows, but 
also circumstances of which the assured would have known, had he not 
deliberately ignored those circumstances. In section 18 (1) MIA, 1906 it is 
stated “the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which in the 
ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him”, thus stating that the 
concept of knowledge in the MIA, 1906 is not limited to subjective or actual 
knowledge. In the case of London General Insurance Company v General 
Marine Underwriters’ Association50, the assured had the information in 
writing in his office (a casualty slip), but had failed to read it. The 
information was treated as constructive knowledge, about which the assured 
ought to have known.
51
 The assured does not have to initiate examinations 
to extend his knowledge; the duty of utmost good faith only concerns what 
the assured knows and not what he could learn.
52  
However, if the assured 
has reason to believe that his knowledge is incomplete or incorrect, he must 
enquire. This would imply that there is an element of honesty when 
considering the assured’s knowledge.53 The concept of honesty is difficult to 
apply to corporations and recent case law suggests that the court should 
rather consider the knowledge of the company in a more objective manner,
54
 
i.e. the relevant knowledge remains to be what the assured knows or ought 
to know.  
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 [1920] 3 K.B. 23. 
51
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When it comes to identification, the knowledge of the persons with 
decision-making authority is considered to be the knowledge of the 
company, i.e. the “directing mind and will”. This requires naturally that the 
person’s authority concerns the relevant area, and not something that is 
completely unrelated to the risk. In the case of Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v 
Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea)
 55
, the court also discusse the 
concept of “blind eye knowledge”, i.e. knowledge that should have been 
known if the assured had not deliberately shut his eyes to the circumstances. 
The court held that there must at least be showed that the assured had reason 
to suspect that there was relevant fact he ought to have known.
56
 Agents of 
the assured are also, as long as they are representing and acting on behalf of 
the assured, considered as “the assured” in MIA, 1906 section 18.57   
 
3.2.1.2 Materiality  
Materiality delimits the duty of disclosure and is therefore crucial to 
understand. Section 18 (1) says that “every material circumstance which is 
known to the assured” is subject to the duty of disclosure, i.e. if a material 
circumstance is deemed to be known by the assured, he will be in breach of 
the duty of disclosure if he fails to disclose it, regardless of the reason for 
the failure.
58
 
 
The leading case Carter v Boehm indicates that the key to determine 
whether non-disclosure constitutes a breach of the duty of disclosure, is if 
the actual risk is different from the risk that the insurer based his decisions 
upon when the contract was concluded.
59
 This would imply a materiality 
test based on a question of increased, or at least different risk.  
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Section 18(2) and section 20(2) MIA, 1906 both state “Every circumstance 
is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in 
fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.” These 
sections have by referring to a “prudent insurer”60 declare that it is the 
general opinion among the insurer community that should be decisive and 
not the opinion of the specific insurer in question. Thus, materiality is as a 
starting point an objective concept.
61
  
 
In the case of Berger & Light Diffusers LTD v Pollock
62
, Section 18(2) and 
20 (2) MIA, 1906 was interpreted to mean that the insurer had to prove that 
the information, had it been disclosed, would have led a hypothetical 
prudent insurer to a different decision on whether or not to accept the risk 
and on what terms.
63
 This proved to be an impractical rule, as it is difficult 
to determine how the insurer would have acted in hindsight. The yardstick is 
however not the insurer in question, but a hypothetical prudent insurer. 
Demanding that the information must be decisive may lead to a situation 
where focus shifts from objectivity to subjectivity; what information is 
considered decisive presumably varies more between the members of the 
insurance community, than what information is considered to affect the risk 
in general.  
 
The opinion of the courts was changed and a new practice of how to 
determine what is material information was defined in the case of Container 
Transport International Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd.
64
 and further developed in the case of Pan Atlantic 
Insurance Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Ltd
65
. In CTI v Oceanus it was held that 
if the legislator had wished the rule to be interpreted as was assumed in the 
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Berger & Light Diffusers LTD v Pollock case, he would have used different 
words such as “decisively influence” or “conclusively influence”. Hence, 
the court considered it sufficient for the insurer to prove that the information 
would have influenced the judgment of a prudent insurer at some level but 
not necessarily changed his mind about the contract or the premium. Based 
on these opinions, the court found no reason why the influence would have 
been decisive for the judgment of the insurer. The opinion thus leaned 
towards the proper definition of materiality being determined by what a 
prudent insurer would want to know when assessing the risk, without any 
prerequisite that the information could lead to a different decision. This was 
substantiated by section 17 and the doctrine of utmost good faith; all 
information that might be of interest to the insurer should be disclosed.
66
  
  
The case of CTI v Oceanus rejected the decisive test but the scope of the 
duty of disclosure became too wide; after all, section 18 (2) and 20 (2) refer 
to circumstances that in some way influences the judgement of a prudent 
insurer. Some further definition of the scope was thus necessary to establish 
and in Pan Atlantic v. Pine Top, the court brought in the demand for 
inducement and formulated a test consisting of two cumulative steps, one 
objective test and one subjective test.
67
  
 
3.2.1.2.1 The Objective Test 
To satisfy the objective test, the information must be of the kind that a 
prudent insurer would need to make pre-contractual judgements of the risk. 
This part of the test has a wide scope; anything that would influence the 
judgement is valid to fulfil the criteria. The insurer does not have to prove 
that it is something that might increase the risk, only that it is something that 
would have been taken into consideration.  
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3.2.1.2.2 The Subjective Test – Inducement  
Even though not explicitly mentioned in the MIA, 1906, the insurer also has 
to prove that the non-disclosure induced the insurer to enter the contract, i.e. 
that the insurer’s lack of information put the assured in a more favourable 
position and made the prospect look more appealing to the insurer. The 
same rule applies to the situation of misrepresentation and it is in the general 
common law rules of misrepresentation that this subjective test finds its 
legitimacy.
68
 To use common law as a supplement to the MIA, 1906 is 
sanctioned by section 91(2). The concept of duty of disclosure in the MIA, 
1906 is unique to the common law system but since misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure are considered as similar situations, it seems rational to 
analogically demand inducement also in the latter situation.  
 
The demand for inducement can also be traced to the very reason for the 
duty of disclosure, namely to even out the unequal access to crucial 
information. If the information was of no subjective relevance to the 
insurer’s judgement and therefore would not have influenced him in any 
way, there is no reason for him to have the choice of avoidance.  
 
In the case of Edgington v Fitzmaurice
69
, the court defined inducing 
circumstances as something that was part of the information upon which a 
decision was made, not necessarily decisive but still circumstances that were 
taken into consideration when forming the decision.
70
 The threshold for 
inducement has since then continued to be a topic for debate. According to 
the court in the case of JEB Fasteners Ltd. v Marks, Bloom & Co
71
, the 
insurer must prove that he was substantially encouraged to enter into the 
contract by the misrepresentation or non-disclosure. If the main motivating 
factor had nothing to do with the information in question, it could not have 
induced the insurer to enter into the contract. To fulfil the subjective test it 
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must have had some impact when the insurer formed his decision.
72
 In the 
more recent case Assucurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group
73
 the 
court goes further by stating that the insurer must prove that had it not been 
for the non-disclosure or misrepresentation, the insurer would not have 
entered into the contract at the present terms i.e., the lack of full and correct 
disclosure had an actual influence on the decision.
74
  
 
 
3.2.1.3 Conclusion  
The scope is determined initially by the knowledge of the assured, and 
further by what is considered material to the prudent insurer. The advantage 
the insurer is getting from the somewhat low threshold for objective 
materiality is partially levelled to the benefit of the assured by the 
requirement of subjective influence. However, since the threshold is quite 
low, the test of materiality still favours the insurer over the assured.   
 
If the insurer has succeeded in fulfilling the objective test, he might find 
himself in a favourable position when setting out to prove that the non-
disclosure actually encouraged him to enter into the contract. Even though 
case law has particularly pointed out that the subjective test must be 
satisfied independently, it cannot be denied that solid evidence in the 
objective test naturally often shows to be helpful for the subjective test, 
being more abstract in its character.  
3.2.1.4 Duration 
The duty of disclosure ceases when the contract is concluded. All the rules 
concerning the duty of disclosure aims at providing the insurer with 
sufficient information to valuate the risk. Once the risk is accepted, there is 
no duty for the assured to keep the insurer informed of any alterations in the 
risk. The insurer’s protection against alterations is through warranties, 
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which will be discussed in section 3.8.1 below. How this relates to the duty 
of utmost good faith remains unclear.
75
 
 
If, however, the contract is modified or extended, the situation is equal to 
the conclusion of an entirely new contract. Hence, the duty of disclosure 
applies as if no earlier contract had existed.
76
 In the case of Commercial 
Union Assurance Co Ltd v Niger Co Ltd
77
, the parties had entered into an 
indefinite insurance contract that could be cancelled by either of the parties 
by giving three months notice. The insurer claimed that this meant an on-
going duty of disclosure, but this approach was not accepted by the court.
78
  
 
3.2.2 NMIP 
 
In the NMIP, as distinguished from the MIA, 1906, the duty of disclosure 
does not have a clear legal connection to the duty of good faith, but is 
regulated as a separate issue and must therefore be treated separately.
79
  
 
NMIP § 3-1 imposes on the assured an active responsibility for providing 
the insurer with “full and correct disclosure”. The questions asked by the 
insurer are not what defines the scope of the duty of disclosure, as in other 
cases of more assured-friendly regulation. The crucial question is rather 
what information the insurer needs in order to make a proper judgment of 
the risk. This is defined in the Plan as “circumstances that are material to the 
insurer when deciding whether and on what conditions he is prepared to 
accept the insurance”. The assured’s active duty to disclose information is 
related to his anticipated knowledge in the field and this burden is weighed 
by the insurers burden of proof when claiming that undisclosed information 
were material to him.  
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Under the Plan, as well as under the MIA, 1906, the approach is that the 
scope does not rely on the assured’s actual knowledge. However, under the 
Plan the subjective knowledge will have impact on the aftermath in case of 
breach.  
 
3.2.2.1 Materiality  
The starting point for determining what circumstances are to be considered 
material is to determine whether they have been decisive for the particular 
insurer. The Plan, unlike the MIA, 1906, in § 3-1 refers to these 
circumstances as “material to the insurer when deciding whether and on 
what conditions he is prepared to accept the insurance”. This means that 
the circumstances must have been subjectively decisive to the insurer in 
question. As it is difficult to prove what information is material to the 
specific insurer in the specific case, he will often turn to more objective 
evidence. It is easier to show what circumstances are considered material by 
presenting standard conditions and previous practice. Hence, since the 
insurer is not limited to his own subjective opinion at the time when the 
contract was concluded, he may also demonstrate his standpoint by turning 
to objective evidence to support his claim. The commentary to the plan 
defines material circumstances as information that an insurer usually can 
and will demand prior to accepting an insurance risk of the type in 
question.
80
 To sum up this paragraph about materiality: it is quite obvious 
that it is the objective requirements of the average insurer that in most cases 
conclusively determines what circumstances should be recognized as 
material. However, different contracts will mean different needs for 
information and therefore the Plan must provide the insurer with the 
possibility to prove what circumstances is material in each specific case.   
The insurer’s actual requirements define the materiality. The starting point 
is thus subjectivity but since the burden of proof lies with the insurer he will 
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often have to show that his claim is objectively acceptable. Documented and 
established practice; insurance- and premium conditions are used to show 
what information the insurer would normally require.  
 
3.2.2.2 Knowledge 
§ 3-1 imposes on the assured the duty to make full and correct disclosure 
during the pre-contractual dialogue. This duty is characterised firstly as 
active; the assured must independently and on his own initiative present 
material circumstances to the insurer. Secondly, it is an objective duty as the 
assured is expected to have, or be able to retrieve, knowledge about all 
circumstances that might be material to the insurer. Furthermore he should 
know what information the insurer might need in order to make a correct 
judgement of the risk, i.e. the duty is not dependant on the insurers 
participation in specifying or collecting information. The subjective 
knowledge of the assured is not relevant to the duty of disclosure. As 
mentioned above, the Plan assumes him to be a professional with substantial 
knowledge about marine insurance.
81
 
 
3.2.2.3 Duration 
§ 3-1 states that the assured is bound by the duty to disclose at the time 
when the contract is concluded and after that, he must make the insurer 
aware if it comes to his attention that faults were made when fulfilling the 
duty. If the circumstances change during the course of the contract, or if it is 
a matter of entirely new circumstances, then the rules on alteration of risk in 
chapter 3 section 2 becomes applicable. These rules will be further 
discussed in subchapter 3.8.2. The NMIP, like the MIA, 1906, considers a 
renewal of an insurance policy as a new contract, and consequently the duty 
of disclosure also applies to renewals.
82
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3.3 Non-disclosure 
Non-disclosure can essentially be described as the opposite of what has been 
defined as full disclosure in the previous chapters. Common law has defined 
some circumstances as material circumstances, but to present all of these 
would be to go beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of NMIP, 
the closely related rules of alteration of risk may be consulted, as § 3-8 
explicitly identifies some changes that shall be considered as alteration of 
the risk. These rules will be examined further in subchapter 3.8.2.  
 
One situation in particular will be examined further as an example, and in 
order to provide the necessary foundation when commenting on the fictional 
scenario presented in section 1.1. In the given situation there had been a 
change of flag state. A change of flag is pointed out in § 3-8 as an alteration 
of risk. The flag state has also been identified as a material circumstance in 
England in the SPATHARI case or Demetriades & Company v The 
Northern Insurance Company Limited
83
. In the SPATHARI case, the 
assured failed to inform the insurer of the fact that the flag of the ship, 
during the insurance period, would be changed from British to Greek. The 
court accepted the insurer’s claim that the change of flag resulted in a whole 
different risk and that this information should have been disclosed.
84
 In the 
case of Sandefjord Ormlund
85
, the assured had informed the insurer about 
the change of flag, but had failed to disclose the consequences of the 
changes. When sailing under a Cyprus flag instead of a Norwegian, the ship 
only had, in accordance with the rules of Cyprus, one chief officer onboard. 
The perception of the insurer was that the ship still had two chief officers, as 
prescribed in Norway. The Norwegian Supreme Court stated that the failure 
to inform the insurer of the fact that the ship now only had one chief officer 
onboard constituted a breach of the duty of disclosure.
86
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3.4 Misrepresentation 
In the NMIP, the provisions concerning the duty of disclosure cover 
misrepresentation and hence there is no need to address the topic of 
misrepresentation independently. However, the MIA, 1906 has divided the 
two duties into two separate sections and they must thus be treated 
separately. The situation of misrepresentation is very similar to non-
disclosure and the two is sometimes hard to distinguish from each other.
87
 
The duty of disclosure in section 18 concerns an active duty to provide 
information, while representation in section 20 is about the duty to truthfully 
answer questions posed by the insurer. As held in the case of Zurich 
General Accident & Liability Insurance Co v Leven
88
 by Lord 
President Normand: 
 
In general, non-disclosure means that you have failed to disclose something 
which was not the subject of a question but which was known to you and 
which you ought to have considered for yourself would be material, 
whereas a representation is something directly said in answer to a specific 
question, and in the present case there can be no reasonable doubt that, if in 
answer to the question "Has a person who is going to drive the car been 
convicted of an offence?" you answer "No," you are making a direct 
representation that such person has not been convicted.
89
 
 
In order for the insurer to invoke the rules of misrepresentation, the assured 
must have made a representation. This usually means that information must 
have passed from the assured to the insurer; misrepresentation may not be 
claimed if the assured has not communicated about a certain circumstance.
90
  
 
However, there are a few situations that may constitute misrepresentation, 
even though communication is absent. In all of these situations, the assured 
is considered to have made a representation even though he has remained 
silent. These situations are useful when determining where 
misrepresentation ends and non-disclosure begins.  
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The first situation is when the insurer is within his right to make 
assumptions and rely on the assured to make disclosure if these assumptions 
are in fact wrong. By not correcting the insurer, the assured makes a 
misrepresentation, as the silence constitutes an implied representation.
91
  
 
The second situation is when the assured makes a correct and true 
representation, but certain information is left out. In this case, the accurate 
representation might be given another meaning when a part of the 
information is missing.
92
   
 
The third situation is implied in section 20(6) MIA, 1906, which states that a 
representation may be corrected or entirely withdrawn before the contract is 
concluded. Hence, if the assured remains silent while knowing that a 
representation that was made truthfully in reality is false, the assured has 
made a misrepresentation.
93
  
 
Through section 20(3), MIA, 1906 recognises two kinds of representations, 
namely facts and expectations/beliefs. It important to separate these two, as 
the assessment of whether there has been a misrepresentation will be 
different for the two categories. Following section 20 (4), a representation is 
true if it is substantially correct. This means that the difference between the 
representation and what is literally true must not be material according to 
the same principles as in section 18. In the case of Alexander v Campbell
94
, 
the assured stated that the ship had been remetalled when it actually had 
gone through a thorough reparation and only parts of the sheathing had been 
replaced. The representation was considered to be substantially correct.
95
 It 
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should also be noted that there is no reference in the section to the 
knowledge of the assured. Thus, the assured is strictly liable for 
representations of fact. The only way to avoid liability if a representation 
turns out to be incorrect is if the representation may be categorised as an 
expectation or belief made in good faith. The innocence of the assured is of 
no relevance if the representation is one of fact. 
 
Section 20 (5) states that an expectation or belief is true if it is made in good 
faith. This seems reasonable since the assured at the point that he makes the 
representation cannot know what the true fact is, but he can truthfully 
represent what he beliefs is the fact, or expects will be the fact. If he makes 
promissory representation, this may be treated as a warranty, a concept that 
will be discussed in section 3.8. When determining whether a representation 
is an expression of a fact or a belief or expectation, the court considers the 
knowledge of the assured and what possibilities the assured has to control 
the relevant circumstances. In the leading case of Bissett v Wilkinsson
96
, a 
representation was made about circumstances that had been evaluated and 
estimated, but never tested in practice. This representation was considered to 
be a belief since the representor could not possibly know for sure about 
theories that had not been put to the test.
97
 A representation made 
concerning an anticipated fact that lies outside the control of the representor, 
is to be treated as an expression of expectation. This was established in 
Bowden v Vaughan
98
, where a person with no authority over the ship 
presented a date for its departure.
99
  
3.5 Innocent Breach 
As explained above, the MIA 1906 does not make a difference between 
negligent breach and innocent breach. The NMIP however has a separate 
paragraph for this situation, with a certain remedy. If the assured is not to be 
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blamed for the non-disclosure or misrepresentation, the insurer remains 
liable. But since the risk is different from the one anticipated at the 
conclusion of the contract, the insurer may cancel the contract by giving 
fourteen days’ notice. There is a general principle of contract that renders 
the insurer a right to supplementary consideration in these situations. In the 
older version of the Plan, this was manifested by giving the insurer right to 
additional premium. However, this rule has been removed since it was 
considered superfluous.
100
  
 
A typical situation where innocent breach comes into play is when the 
assured, after the contract has been concluded, realises that the disclosure 
was not complete or that a representation was not true. The assured is in 
such a situation under § 3-1 obliged to notify the insurer about the fault. The 
insurer may then claim innocent breach of the duty of disclosure according 
to § 3-4. The consequences for an innocent breach are not unnecessarily 
harsh for the assured. Nor will the insurer be forced to stand liable for a risk 
which he did not intended, except for during the notice period of fourteen 
days. There is no further remedy available in the situation of innocent 
breach.  
 
3.6 Exclusions  
3.6.1 Exclusions of the MIA, 1906 
Section 18(3)(b) MIA, 1906 does not exclude information that the insurer 
with some diligence could have retrieved on his own; the insurer is not even 
responsible for collecting information from the market or the public 
domain.
101
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Section 18(3)(c) MIA, 1906 concerning waiver, has come to be the most 
important section for the courts to use when justifying a judgement that does 
not strike unnecessarily hard upon the assured. While in other cases thought 
to be an active statement, the judgements concerning the MIA, 1906 shows 
that courts are leaning towards the exemption of waiver also in cases where 
the insurer has not explicitly waived the non-disclosed information. The 
typical situation is when the assured has made what he beliefs to be full 
disclosure, and a reasonably careful insurer would have made further 
enquiries but the insurer neglect to do so. The insurer is then considered to 
have waived information that would have been exposed following a more 
thorough investigation.
102
 A waiver can also be made by asking questions 
that clearly indicate that the insurer is only interested in limited information. 
This principle has among others been explained in the case of Doheny v 
New India Assurance
103
, where L.J. Longmore formulated the test to be 
applied as follows: 
 
Whether or not such a waiver is present depends on a true construction of 
the proposal form, the test being, would a reasonable man reading the 
proposal form be justified in thinking that the insurer had restricted his right 
to receive all material information, and consented to the omission of the 
particular information in issue?
104
 
 
3.6.2 Exclusions of the NMIP 
The scope of the duty of disclosure is affected by the insurer’s knowledge or 
presumed knowledge on certain matters. § 3-5 prevents the insurer from 
claiming non-disclosure when he knew or ought to have known about the 
circumstance that the assured should have disclosed. It would be in total 
contrast to the construction of the rules not to take the knowledge of the 
insurer into the equation, as the very purpose of the rules is to level the 
inequality of access to information. According to the commentary, phrase in 
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§ 3-5 “ought to have known” includes the situation where the assured has 
disclosed some information and the insurer whish to know more but 
neglects to communicate his wish. This sets out the point where the insurer 
has to take active part in the disclosure and is where the duty of the assured 
ends. The insurer must naturally speak up if he has been given incomplete 
information and he is aware of it.
105
  
 
The exclusion in § 3-5 is even applicable in the situation of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. If the insurer knows that the assured deliberately gives 
him false information but still takes on the risk, there is no reason to give 
him the right to cancel the insurance or use it as a leverage to cancel other 
contracts he might have with the assured.   
 
If a circumstance that might have been material to the insurer at the time the 
contract was concluded has since then ceased to be material, the insurer may 
not invoke the §§ 3-3 and 3-4. In this case it is not the lack of inequality of 
information that is the rationale but the lack of materiality. The duty of 
disclosure is limited to information that is material to the insurer and the 
assured does not have to provide the insurer with all the facts about the 
subject of the insurance. The moment a circumstance ceases to be material, 
it is excluded from the duty of disclosure. In this situation there is no reason 
why the insurer should not be able to act if the assured has fraudulently 
misrepresented the facts. The element of conscious speculation does not 
exist, as it did in the previous case, and the insurer did not know that he 
dealt with a dishonest assured when he decided to take on the risk. 
Therefore the exclusion concerning facts that are no longer material does 
not apply to fraudulent misrepresentation.
106
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3.7 Remedies 
As mentioned above, the assured is responsible for the disclosure being 
completely and truthfully made. There are thus two possible ways in which 
breach may be committed.  
1. Non-disclosure: Failure to disclose a circumstance that is material to 
the insurer. The circumstance must have been known- or ought to 
have been known by the assured in the ordinary course of business. 
Inducement is required.   
2. Misrepresentation: The assured has made a false representation of 
fact or expectation or belief. This false representation must be 
material to the insurer and he must have been induced by 
misrepresentation.  
 
3.7.1 MIA, 1906 - Avoidance 
The remedy in the MIA, 1906 is absolute, uncompromising and lacks any 
possibility of adjustment according to the level of culpa. Non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation is considered a breach of the duty of uberimae fidei and is 
therefore treated as a breach, making the assured strictly responsible to fulfil 
the duty of disclosure. There is no need to investigate what the assured 
intentions with the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was in order to 
invoke the sanctions. The mere fact that the duty of utmost good faith has 
been broken is enough to give the insurer the right to avoid the contract.
107
  
 
A breach of the duty of utmost good faith does not render the insurer a right 
to claim damages from the assured. In the case of Banque Financiere de la 
Cite SA (formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann SA) v Westgate Insurance Co 
(formerly Hodge General & Mercantile Co Ltd
108
, the court reasoned about 
this matter as such. The duty of utmost good faith is a non-contractual duty 
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that arises during the pre-contractual negotiations. As such, the only remedy 
is avoidance and no damages for breach of contract can be invoked since 
there was no contract at the time the duty was breached.
109
 It has further 
been claimed that this also has to do with the fact that the doctrine of utmost 
good faith, even though developed under common law, is equitable in its 
nature. Bennet, however, is of another opinion. One reason is that for a 
matter to be tried in equity, it must first be determined whether there 
actually is a contract, and this is determined in common law. Another reason 
is that in equity the insurer would have to argue that the contract should be 
considered void
110
, whereas in fact the remedy is to be given the opportunity 
to avoid the contract, i.e. make it voidable. Even in cases of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the courts have remained consistent with the principle 
that a breach of utmost good faith does not render a contract void, but gives 
the insurer the choice of avoidance. Thus, the remedy for breach of the duty 
of utmost good faith in the MIA, 1906 does not arise in common law but in 
equity.
111
  
 
Normally when a contract is avoided, considerations exchanged between the 
parties should be returned and full effort should be given in order to place 
the parties in the position from which they originated. This is called 
restitution and is mentioned in section 84 MIA, 1906. However, according 
to section 84(3)(a) MIA, 1906, premiums shall not be returned if the 
avoidance is based on the assured’s fraudulent or dishonest behavior.  
 
3.7.2 NMIP – According to Culpa 
Marine insurance offers less protection than general insurance for the 
assured upon failure to comply with the duty of disclosure. As mentioned 
above, the assured is expected to be a professional with considerable 
experience from the insurance market. However, the NMIP offers the 
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assured more protection than the MIA, 1906 while linking the sanction to 
the level of culpa.
112
 
 
In the case of fraudulent representation, the insurer, may according to § 3-2, 
avoid the contract and any other contract with the assured. The rationale is 
that the insurer should not be bound by contracts with a person who is 
acting dishonestly and the materiality of the circumstances in question is 
therefore of no relevance.
113
   
 
The NMIP takes a pragmatic stand on remedies and the main focus for a 
negligent breach is to put the insurer in the position he would have been in 
had full and correct disclosure been made. Various remedies are presented 
in § 3-3 and the court should apply the one that compensates the insurer for 
the lack of information. Hence, the insurer must show how he would have 
reacted to the information, had he received it before the contract was 
concluded. This is a matter of subjectivity and the insurer may not rely on 
how other insurers would have reacted, e.g. if the insurer wants to avoid the 
contract, he must show on a balance of probabilities that he would not have 
taken on the risk.
114
  
 
The sanctioning system in the NMIP does not provide a wide enough range 
of solutions to each and every case to put the insurer in the same situation 
that he would have been in, had full disclosure been made. An example 
from the commentaries is when the insurer would have incorporated a safety 
provision in the insurance contract. This is somewhat compensated by the 
insurer’s possibility to cancel the contract by giving fourteen days’ notice. 
The commentary also mentions the fact that there is hardly any case law 
related to the duty of disclosure thus creating a more differentiated 
sanctioning system would be unnecessarily complicated.
115
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One important feature of the sanctioning system is § 3-6 which state that the 
insurer must notify the assured if the insured discovers that the information 
given is incomplete, or that a representation is incorrect. Failing to do so 
without undue delay will render the insurer to lose his right to invoke the 
breach of the duty of disclosure.  
3.8 Changes of the Risk during the 
contract period 
After the contract is signed, the insurer must be able to rely on the risk 
remaining fundamentally the same during the contract period. To provide a 
full covering explanation on how changes in the risk are handled under the 
English and the Nordic system would be to go outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, since the rules are closely related to the duty of disclosure, 
a brief presentation will follow.  
3.8.1 MIA, 1906 - Warranties  
A warranty is in a technical sense a certain term of the insurance contract 
and must be incorporated directly or by reference into the contract to be 
valid. This is normally achieved by presenting it in writing in the policy, 
oral warranties are valid but unusual.
116
   
 
A warranty means that the assured promises to perform certain obligations 
during a pre-defined period of time. Should the assured fail to comply with 
the mentioned warranties, the risk initially intended to be covered by the 
insurer is altered, and the insurer is hence relieved from the liability 
undertaken in the insurance contract. Thus, the insurer may set out some 
prerequisites before taking on a risk and then use these warranties as a 
shield if the conditions are not fulfilled.
117
 Breach of warranty automatically 
terminates the contract of insurance, unless the insurer invokes a waiver of 
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termination, by which the insurer declares that he wants the contract to 
continue despite the breach.
118
   
 
3.8.2 NMIP - Alteration of risk 
For the purpose of comparison, the rules on alteration of the risk in NMIP 
Chapter 3 Section 2 and the rules on safety regulations in section 3 may be 
considered to be the warranty rules of the Plan. The rationale for the rules is 
to act as a guarantee for the insurer, that the risk will remain fundamentally 
the same during the contract period. The Plan has chosen to focus on 
alteration of the risk rather than escalation of the risk. The reason is that it 
may be impossible to appreciate how the changes will affect the risk at the 
times that they are incurred.
119
 Thus, it seems fair to impose an obligation 
on the assured to notify the insurer about the changes so that he may take 
the necessary precautions.  
 
As mentioned in section 3.3, there are a few situations that are pre-defined 
as alterations of risk in § 3-8. These are changes of: State of registration, 
manager of the ship, classification society and the company responsible for 
technical/maritime operation of the ship. Section 2 also point out other 
circumstances, changes of which will raise a duty for the assured to take 
action, but these will not be dealt with in this thesis. Other changes must be 
of such significance that the explicit or implied foundations of the contract 
are changed.
120
 Furthermore, § 3-12 states that the altered circumstance 
must have remained material to the insurer if he is to invoke any of the 
remedy rules of § 3-9 (wilfully conducted alterations of the assured will 
modify the liability of the insurer) or § 3-10 (the insurers right to cancel the 
insurance). However, the materiality is of no significance when it comes to 
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§ 3-11 and the assured’s duty to notify the insurer as soon as it comes to his 
knowledge that an alteration of the risk will, or has already occurred.
121
  
 
 
                                                 
121
 NMIP 2013 – Commentary, supra note 79, pp. 97-98. 
 49 
4 Comparative analysis and 
recent developments 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first one will constitute a 
comparative analysis between the two systems. The main focus will be 
answering some of the questions raised in the purpose of the thesis. Many of 
the differences between the MIA, 1906 and the NMIP have already been 
highlighted in chapter 3. The other section will present a brief summary of 
the recent developments in the UK, Australia and in the Nordic region. The 
idea is to provide the reader with a glimpse of some of the changes that may 
be implemented in the future.
122
  
 
4.1 Litigation 
Inquiries have shown that the business consider MIA, 1906 section 18 as a 
source of disputes. A member survey conducted by the risk management 
association AIRMIC’s report from 2010 suggests that up to one out of three 
in the market have had disputes over section 18 during the last five years.
123
 
Over the last ten years, there have been 41 judgments on section 18.
124
 To 
give an idea of what the costs are for that number disputes, the Law 
Commission has estimated that the insurers and assured together spend 
some 46,4 £M per year in England and Wales on disputes concerning 
section 18 MIA, 1906.
125
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In Norway however court cases on the duty of disclosure and 
misrepresentation is scarce. There have historically been very few cases and 
none since the introduction of the 1996 Plan, upon which the NMIP of 2013 
is based.
126
 
 
There may be many explanations as to why the duty of disclosure has 
caused so much litigation in England and almost none in Norway. One 
theory presented by Wilhelmsen and Bull is that the insurer can find most of 
the material information without the participation of the assured.
127
 This 
could perhaps explain why there has been so few lawsuits in Norway, but it 
does not help when justifying the large amount of lawsuits in England; quite 
the contrary. The explanation would imply that the Norwegian insurance 
companies are better at collecting information than their English 
counterparts. Another possible scenario is that they are playing a more 
active part in the disclosure of material circumstances. The Law 
Commission of England has while evaluating the MIA, 1906 stated that 
section 18 perhaps does not put enough pressure on the insurer to take an 
active role in this aspect of the pre-contractual process.
128
 This has partially 
to do with the remedy of avoidance, which will be discussed further down in 
this section. One important rule to support the explanation provided by 
Wilhelmsen and Bull is NMIP § 3-7, which gives the insurer access to 
information about the ship held by the ship’s classification society.  
 
Another explanation might be the differences in the test of materiality. The 
MIA, 1906 has a test based on the prudent insurer, complemented with an 
inducement test that does not require the circumstance to be decisive. The 
NMIP, on the other hand, demands the circumstance to be decisive for the 
insurer in question. The insured may rely on objective evidence to support 
his claim of materiality, but the threshold nevertheless seems to be higher 
compared to the MIA, 1906. A consequence of a higher threshold when 
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proving materiality is that the outcome of the hearing becomes more 
uncertain, which in turn deters the insurer from turning to litigation.  
 
The harsh consequences of avoidance in the MIA, 1906 for breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith are also something that may induce the insurer to 
file a lawsuit. This absolute and uncompromising remedy may have been a 
main reason for the detailed scrutiny of all aspects of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith. Under the NMIP, the insurer must show how he would have 
acted, had he been given the information. This prerequisite lays further 
burden on the insurer while claiming breach of the duty of disclosure. Not 
only does the insurer have to show that the circumstance was a decisive one 
for it to qualify as material; he then also has to show in what way it was 
decisive. This procedure, combined with the variation of available remedies 
makes it far less attractive for the insurer to take the case up to court.  
 
One main conclusion to be drawn is that the MIA, 1906 clearly is a more 
insurer friendly act and that this imbalance must have contributed to the 
high number of lawsuits.  
 
One fundamentally different reason could be variations in the market. One 
might assume that, since Norway is a considerably smaller country, the 
explanation is simply that there are fewer players in the Norwegian market 
than in the UK market. However, the Nordic market is the second largest 
global market for hull insurance with 11,1% of the global premium. The UK 
markets has a total share of 18,3%.
129
 That means that despite the fact that 
more insurance policies are written in the UK, the UK market being larger 
than the Norwegian market cannot explain the difference in number of 
lawsuits. The Norwegian market is by far the most significant one within the 
Nordic market.  
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4.2 Warranties and alteration of risks 
By incorporating warranties, the scope of the insurance cover is set out and 
as mentioned above, the scope of the duty of disclosure is also affected by 
the warranties. If a certain circumstance is covered by a warranty, the 
insurer does not have to worry about it since he will not be liable if the 
warranty is breached. Also, the assured may leave this part out of his 
disclosure, as it will not be part of the risk evaluation. An example of this is 
when a warranty is set out to the effect that the insured vessel will not 
navigate in e.g. areas where it can expect to encounter ice. The insurer then 
does not have to evaluate the risk of navigating the vessel in such condition 
and the assured does not have to disclose detailed information on how well 
equipped the ship is for navigating in icy waters.
130
  
 
Warranties could appear to be very similar to representations, but breach of 
a warranty must be distinguished from misrepresentation. The most 
prominent features of a warranty is that it is a promise to fulfil a certain 
obligation and that promise is incorporated in the contract; the 
representation has neither of these features. A representation is as explained 
in subchapter 3.4 a presentation of a fact or a belief or an expectation; the 
assured answers a question regarding a certain circumstance. With a 
warranty on the other hand, the assured undertake an obligation and must 
comply with the performance of this obligation. In the case of Pawson v 
Watson
131
, Lord Mansfield emphasised that a representation is not part of 
the contract but of the pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith, while the 
warranty is actually part of the contract.
132
 The case of De Hahn v 
Hartley
133
 further explains the differences by maintaining, “There is a 
material distinction between a warranty and a representation. A 
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representation may be equitable or substantially answered; but a warranty 
must be strictly complied with.”134 
 
The case of Newcastle Fire Insurance Co v. Macmorran & Co
135
 identifies 
another difference between a warranty and a representation, namely that 
materiality has no relevance to the warranty. “It is a first principle of the law 
of insurance, on all occasions, that where a representation is material it must 
be complied with – immaterial, that immateriality may be inquired into and 
shown; but that if there is a warranty it is part of the contract that the matter 
is such as it is represented to be. Therefore, the materiality or immateriality 
signifies nothing.”136  
 
The main purpose of warranties is to define and preserve the risk. Alteration 
of risk has a clear purpose to protect the insurer from any changes to the 
risk. Both warranty and alteration of risk is there because the insurer must 
be able to rely on that the circumstances regarding the risk that was 
disclosed at the time the contract was signed remains the same throughout 
the insurance period. Thus, the alteration of risk rules is the relevant 
counterpart in the NMIP for a comparative analysis with warranty. It should 
however be noted that the concepts of warranties is something that does not 
exist in Nordic law. Thus, what combines warranties and alteration of risk is 
that both systems protect the insurer from an alteration of the risk.  
 
The main difference is that only changes in material circumstances will 
constitute an alteration of the risk, while a breach of a warranty will render 
the contract voidable, regardless of materiality.  
 
The rules on alteration of risk stipulate communication between the assured 
and the insurer. Furthermore, it presents solutions on how to keep the policy 
from being cancelled and is generally a rather pragmatic set of rules. The 
warranty system on the other hand seems to be out of date, as it strictly 
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provides that the insurer complies with the prerequisites. If the assured fails, 
the contract becomes voidable. The insurer has to present a waiver for the 
policy to remain in force. This must be considered a highly impractical way 
to delimit the duty of disclosure.    
  
4.3 Recent Development 
4.4 Law reviews in common law systems 
4.4.1 UK 
The MIA, 1906 is currently under review and the idea is to draft a bill with 
suggested amendments by the end of 2013. The Law Commission has 
especially pointed out the duty of disclosure as an area that needs 
revision.
137
 Three aims have been set out by the Commission namely: 
1) To clarify how the duty of disclosure should be fulfilled.  
2) To encourage the insurers to take a more active part in assisting the 
assureds in the process of disclosure.  
3) To provide fair remedies. 
 
Besides being somewhat unclear, the MIA, 1906 has also been said to be 
insurer friendly, and thus lack balance between the interests of the parties to 
an insurance contract. The remedy system has also been pointed out by the 
law commission as a reason as to why so many disputes end up in litigation. 
As mentioned above, the remedy system under the MIA, 1906 provides only 
one solution namely avoidance, and there is no possibilities for the courts to 
adjust the remedy to a perhaps more suitable solution in the specific case. 
The commission therefore suggest a more flexible model, more similar to 
other legal systems e.g. the NMIP. The modifications recommended 
includes remedies adapted to the culpa of the assured and according to how 
the insurer would have acted, had full disclosure been made, e.g. it is 
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proposed that the remedy in the case of non-fraudulent breach, should act as 
to prevent the insurer from ending up in a less favourable situation. Hence, 
avoidance as a remedy should only be used in those cases where the insurer 
would not have accepted the insurance. If, on the other hand, the insurer 
would have insisted on different terms, the contract should be treated as if 
those terms were included. If the insurer would have accepted but charged a 
higher premium then the claim should be reduced in proportion to the higher 
premium.
138
  
 
This proposed set of rules have obvious similarities with NMIP § 3-3 and 
may thus be considered as a step towards a more assured friendly legislation 
in more harmony with many of the civil law legislations.  
 
4.4.2 Australia 
The governing law in Australia is the Marine Insurance Act, 1909
139
, which 
is based on the MIA, 1906. Australian insurance law has historically 
followed in the footsteps of the English insurance law, but this changed in 
1984. The Australian Insurance Contract Act, 1984
140
 excluded marine 
insurance, but brought major changes into general insurance law.
141
 Some of 
the changes may now be implemented also into marine insurance, as the 
Australian Law Reform Commission is drafting a new Marine Insurance 
Act. A bill has been presented with several proposed reforms relevant for 
this thesis.  
 
Among the key recommendations published on 7 May 2001, last modified 
on 3 August 2012 are three reforms of particular interest. The first two 
concern the abolishment of the concept of warranties.  A diversion of 
remedies for breach of any express term of the contract would replace 
express warranties. Furthermore, the Act would permit express terms 
                                                 
138
 The Law Commission, supra note 101, p. 13-14. 
139
 Marine Insurance Act, 1909 (Cth). Henceforward MIA, 1909. 
140
 Insurance Contract Act, 1984 (Cth). 
141
 The Law Commission, supra note 101, p. 27. 
 56 
regarding seaworthiness and legality and those terms would replace the 
implied warranties that are now used to protect the insurer for such risks.
 142
  
 
Another radical change would be the modification of the duty of disclosure. 
Instead of using the prudent insurer when determining materiality and what 
circumstances that needs to be disclosed, the proposal is to consider what 
the assured knows to be material, or what a reasonable person in the 
assureds position would know to be relevant to the insurer; a prudent 
assured test.
143
 The main motivation for making this change is that it would, 
according to the Australian Law Reform Commission, solve two 
problematic issues of the existing Act. The first one is that the duty as 
presently formulated is considered to be far too extensive. To make full 
disclosure, the assured need to know what circumstances is considered 
material to a prudent insurer and not only the decisive circumstances, but 
also anything that would influence the insurer while evaluating the risk and 
forming his decision. Hence, the assured must have a great knowledge when 
it comes to matters of insurance, and this cannot be expected from all 
shipowners. The second problem has been addressed in the case of Pan 
Atlantic v Pine Top and concerns the subjective part of the test of 
materiality. Section 24(2) MIA, 1909 is factually identical to section 18(2) 
MIA, 1906, as both only relate to the prudent insurer and do not explicitly 
require inducement of the actual insurer. This implies that before Pan 
Atlantic v Pine Top, it was not clear whether the actual insurer would have 
to be influenced in order to claim materiality and invoke breach of the duty 
of disclosure.
144
 The principle about inducement set out in Pan Atlantic v 
Pine Top has been implemented in Australian law by the case of Akedian Co 
Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd and Sun Alliance Australia. Ltd
145
.   
 
The modification of the duty of disclosure would further mean that the 
remedy for fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation remains the 
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same, namely, that the insurer may avoid the contract and keep whatever 
premium that he has received. If, however, the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation is not fraudulent, the insurer must show how the lack of 
full and correct disclosure and representation has affected his mind while 
forming his decision on whether to take on the risk, and at what terms, and 
for what premium. If the insurer would have accepted the risk on other 
terms, he will remain liable under the insurance contract, except for losses 
that are attributable to the non-disclosure or misrepresentation. Premiums, 
deductibles or excess can be adjusted and taken into consideration 
correspondingly when defining the scope of liability for the insurer.
146
  
 
The changes proposed by the Australian law commission defiantly make the 
Act more like the NMIP, especially with respect to the remedy system. The 
“reasonable assured test” enacted in The Australian Insurance Contract Act, 
1984,
147
 are now being examined for the purpose of reform of the MIA, 
1906. The result of introducing the “reasonable assured test” has been 
satisfactory. However, critics claim that it is uncertain and that clarifications 
should be amended to the Act. This reveals the importance of not only 
suggesting reforms focusing on bringing equality into UK marine insurance 
law, but certainty and precision must also be addressed.  
 
4.4.3 Recent case law 
Recent case law has not brought any notable changes into the area of the 
duty of disclosure. Nevertheless, one case, WISE (Underwriting Agency Ltd 
v Grupo Nacional Provincial SA
148
, will be highlighted as it deals with the 
concept of a reasonable careful insurer. If the assured presents a risk fairly, 
the insurer must show due diligence and make appropriate enquires if 
necessary. Otherwise the court may consider his negligence as a waiver 
according to MIA, 1906 Section 18(3)(c). The reasonable careful insurer is, 
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according to L.J. Rix “neither a detective on one hand nor lacking in 
common sense on the other.
149
 This indicated that the courts are shifting 
towards a more practical view when it comes to the insurer. This resembles 
the provision in NMIP § 3-6, concerning the insurer’s duty to give notice to 
the assured if he discovers that he has been given incomplete or inaccurate 
information. Attempts to move the focus away from strict and rigid 
interpretations of rules, and give more attention to how business is 
reasonably conducted are also made in general contract law. The starting 
point was the case of Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v West 
Bromwich Buildning Society
150
.  
 
4.5 The Norwegian system – Nordic 
integration   
As mentioned above, there are only a few cases under the NMIP concerning 
the duty of disclosure and misrepresentation. The insurance market seems to 
be satisfied with the construction of the Plan, though the author cannot 
know about everything that stirs under the surface. Hence, no major reforms 
have been made to the construction of the NMIP since the latest major 
review in 1996. The principal development is the introduction of the Nordic 
Marine Insurance Plan, which came into force on the 1
st
 of January 2013. 
The Nordic Plan is for all relevant purposes identical to the Norwegian 
Marine Insurance Plan of 1996, version 2010. The important difference is 
that all the Nordic shipowners’ associations are now signatory parties to the 
Plan.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 2.2.2 above, the NMIP is drafted by The Nordic 
Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor). Within this organisation there is a 
Standing Revision Committee that is continuously looking at improvements 
of the Plan and new versions are published every few years. Insurers may 
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propose amendments trough Cefor and shipowners trough their national 
shipowners’ associations. No major changes are planned as of the 
publishing date of this thesis.
151
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5 Conclusion  
In the common law system, the duty to disclose is part of the more general 
duty to exercise utmost good faith. In Nordic legislation however, duty of 
disclosure is dealt with as a separate issue. While the MIA, 1906 has 
developed in the courts during the centuries; the NMIP is the result of a 
close cooperation between shipowners and insurance companies dating back 
to 1871. The difference in the way these two set of rules has developed is 
good to have in mind when comparing the MIA, 1906 and the NMIP. It 
should also be remembered that at the time the NMIP was drafted, the 
principles of the duty of disclosure had been set out in England, and the first 
authors of the NMIP were inspired by common law.  
 
During the 20
th
 century, the principles of common law was enacted in the 
UK as the MIA, 1906 was passed. The Act inspired other common law 
countries to draft bills similar to the MIA, 1906. Since then, there has not 
been much modification made in the field of marine insurance law. There 
are many conflicts in the UK concerning the duty of disclosure and hence 
much litigation. The rules are considered to be insurer friendly, as they do 
not encourage the insurer to take active part in the disclosure of 
circumstances material to the risk and the remedy for breach is avoidance. 
The problems often occur when peril has struck and the assured claims 
compensation under the insurance. The only remedy available is avoidance 
and the sanctioning system does not take culpa into account. Thus, the 
consequence for a fraudulent assured who has misrepresented a mayor 
circumstance, is the same as for a innocent assured who by mistake failed to 
mention a circumstance he did not realize was material. The situation gives 
the insurer incentive to scrutinize the possibilities to limit their liability or 
avoid the contract in whole. As a result of this imbalance between the 
parties to an insurance contract, and since there are often high value assets at 
stake, the insurer has much to gain on refusing a claim with reference to a 
breach of the duty of disclosure. 
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The NMIP is much more balanced, especially when it comes to the available 
remedies. Initially, the remedy is decided according to the culpa of the 
assured.  If the breach is negligent, the insurer must show how he was 
affected by the breach and the remedy is set correspondingly. The test of 
materiality may be somewhat clearer in the NMIP, but it should be 
remembered that these rules has not really been set to test in a court of law.  
 
Another possible explanation to why the number of lawsuits is so much 
higher in UK compared to Norway might be related to the markets. Can the 
answer lie in the fact that the Norwegian market is a smaller one with only a 
few players who are to a large extent familiar to one another? According to 
the author, this cannot be an accurate explanation. The integrated Nordic 
marine hull insurance market is the second largest in the world and Nordic 
insurance companies provides insurance to shipowners globally.  
 
The answer must rather be that the NMIP are, as a result of the cooperation 
between the insurers and the assured, much more balanced than the MIA, 
1906. Furthermore, the participation makes the parties more aware of the 
meaning of the rules. This knowledge is accessible to anyone through the 
commentaries to the plan. Despite from being balanced, the Plan is hence 
also quite easy to interpret. It should also be noted that a standing committee 
is continuously working to improve the Plan and keep it up-to-date.  
 
How the MIA, 1906 and the NMIP is dealing with alterations of the risk 
during the contract period may also have some effect on the duty of 
disclosure. The MIA, 1906 uses warranties to guarantee that the risk 
remains fundamentally the same. If the assured fails to comply, the contract 
of insurance is terminated. The NMIP on the other hand has chosen a 
different approach. When the contract is concluded, the duty of disclosure 
transfers into a duty to notify the insurer of any alteration of the risk. By 
defining what may constitute an alteration of the risk, the NMIP clarifies the 
duty of disclosure. The consequences if the risk is altered depends on 
whether the assured in any way participated in the change, and how material 
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the change is to the insurer. The system is thus a rather flexible one that 
strives to keep the policy active if possible. The differences in this aspect 
between the MIA, 1906 and the NMIP is an example of how the NMIP 
presents solutions that attempts to avoid any situations where the parties 
may end up in a conflict due to uncertainty or imbalance.  
 
The extent to which the assured is liable for providing the insurer with the 
proper information generally depends on the experience and knowledge the 
assured can be expected to possess. While beginning the negotiations prior 
to a marine insurance contract, the insurer and the assured will start off in 
two different corners. The insurer is naturally the expert on insurance but 
does not initially know much about the risk of the particular insurance 
object, namely the ship. The assured on the other hand is assumed to know 
basically everything that can be known about the ship. The assured certainly 
is no expert on insurance, even though expected to have greater experience 
on insurance than the typical assured. However, when it comes to marine 
insurance, both the MIA, 1906 and the NMIP assumes that both parties are 
professionals with a high level of understanding on how the insurance 
market works and what is expected of them. In many cases this will be the 
truth, since a broker often will be involved. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that the assured in marine insurance have more experience than the average 
entity searching cover for a risk. It should however be remembered that 
what knowledge and experience a shipowner has of providing an insurer 
with full and correct disclosure may differ, but the insurer remains an expert 
on evaluating risk.  
 
The idea of the duty of disclosure is that the insurer and assured shall meet 
and produce a good insurance contract from which they both get a benefit. 
The assured explains what risk and the circumstances concerning this risk 
that he wants transferred to the insurer, and the insurer will then use his 
knowledge about risk and insurance to propose a reasonable policy. The 
rules shall therefore create an environment where the assureds’ total 
knowledge about the risk can be stripped down to the relevant parts, by 
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using the insurer’s knowledge about what information is relevant to assess 
the risk. The ideal would be that the insurer gets just the right information, 
and thereby being able to provide the assured with an insurance contract that 
covers exactly the right risks, to a matching premium. This would be the 
most efficient way to do business.  
 
The responsibility of making full and correct disclosure lies with the 
assured. The insurer may to a large extent remain inactive and wait for 
information to fall in his lap. The problem with this wide duty is that the 
assured, even though assumed to possess extensive experience from the 
insurance business, is not a professional insurer, and cannot be expected to 
know everything about the insurance business, nor can he read the mind of 
the insurer. One way of solving this is to use questionnaires. This would 
however perhaps make the process to stiff and by posing the question “is 
there anything else that the insurer should know about?” the scope of the 
necessary disclosure would remain unclear. Conclusively it may be hard for 
the insurer to know what circumstances is material and the sanctions for a 
breach is quite harsh, at least under the MIA, 1906. This may result in an 
“all or nothing disclosure”, which is not an ideal situation for either of the 
parties.   
 
The knowledge of the insurer is significant when analysing the duty of 
disclosure. Most of the information that the insurer needs in order to assess 
the risk is available in various ship registers and public databases, the 
insurer might not have to get any information at all directly from the 
assured. With modern technology, more and more information regarding 
ships is getting digitalized and thus getting more accessible to the insurer. 
However, despite all the modern time databases and ship registrars, the 
assured is still considered to have a closer connection to the object insured 
and accordingly the need for the duty of disclosure remains. There is 
significant rationale for keeping a quite strict legislation. Insurance as a way 
for a business to minimize the risk and transfer it to an insurer is a 
cornerstone in modern economy. A business with the proper insurance cover 
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will not have to go bankrupt when peril strikes; this is crucial for a stable 
economy and labour market, i.e. it is absolutely necessary to safeguard a 
well functioning insurance market where the insurance companies may 
properly calculate the risk. Also poorly run companies seek to obtain 
insurance and the law must be prepared for all eventualities and impose a 
just and fair share of liability on each of the parties. Even though there is no 
need for strict legislation when business relations are good, the legislator 
cannot assume that this will always be the situation. An Act should provide 
certainty and consistency into the market, and protect the parties from 
unreasonable consequences for their actions.  
 
In the experience of the author, since the insurance business is exposed to 
stiff competition, and assured are viewed as customers and not advisories, 
the insurer will assist the assured in the process of diligence. How the 
disclosure works in real life will of course depend on the relationship 
between the insurer and the assured, the experience of the assured, and 
whether a broker on behalf of the assured is involved or not. The insurer 
will often take on a greater responsibility than he is legally obliged to. This 
perception has received some support in the statistics presented by the Law 
Commission in 2012. The figures shows that the when dealing with small 
businesses, the insurer is more active and asks more questions, thereby 
assisting the assured with the disclosure, than when dealing with larger 
businesses.
152
  
 
To sum up the part concerning the knowledge of the parties, liability mainly 
lies with the assured. Neither the MIA, 1906 nor the NMIP imposes on the 
insurer to take an active part in retrieving the material circumstances 
regarding the risk. Even though both set of rules exclude actual and 
constructive knowledge of the insurer, the insurer is not obliged to use his 
sources of information to expand his knowledge. The NMIP however does 
state in the commentaries that the insurer must show due diligence with 
respect to the information given, meaning that he must notify the insurer if 
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he knows that the information is incorrect or incomplete. The availability of 
information though not having any extensive legal significance, it may still 
be important in practice. On a tough market, the insurers are fighting to sign 
policies with the shipowners in their respective target group. It should 
always be remembered that since the insurance policy is a commercial 
contract and the assured is actually a client of the insurer, it is in the 
insurer’s interest to treat the assured accordingly. There is thus no practical 
reason to why the insurer should remain inactive during the pre-contractual 
negotiations just because the assured has an active duty of disclosure. Most 
of the information is available to the insurer on the public domain or in 
various registers. In the experience of the author, insurers therefore do not 
bother the assured to provide them with information they can retrieve 
themselves just as easily. Furthermore, as the Plan entitles the insurer to 
obtain information directly from the ship’s classification society, the duty of 
disclosure in some situations becomes obsolete. Finally, even though the 
assured is a professional with more knowledge about insurance than the 
typical client, it still is the insurer who has most knowledge on this field and 
in many cases he is expected to lead the assured through the process of 
concluding an insurance policy.  
 
As indicated in chapter 4, the marine insurance law is currently being 
revived in the UK and in Australia. The duty of disclosure has been   
identified as one of the areas in most need of modification due to the high 
numbers of litigation. Effective disclosure supports a competitive and 
efficient insurance market capable of providing cover for a huge variety of 
risks. Change in law should lower the transaction costs, as it would bring 
certainty into the system. However, the insurance market is generally not 
very open to changes. This can partially be explained by the very essence of 
the market being created to oppose risk. Changes means uncertainty and 
uncertainty means risk and risk costs money. The English insurance law has 
developed during a very long period of time and this gives a perception of 
certainty, despite the high number of lawsuits. When new concepts are 
brought in, it normally takes long time for the market to accept it, one 
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example being the reluctance to use the latest version of the institute 
clauses
153
. Another reason is that the imbalance and uncertainty serves the 
purposes of two groups, namely insurance companies and lawyers. There 
are accordingly more things to consider when discussing changes in the 
field of marine insurance law, e.g. relating to politics and what influence 
these two groups has in society.  
 
Considering the ever-ongoing globalization and shifts of economic power 
centers, the UK insurance market must make sure it does not fall behind. As 
a shipowner seeking cover for a risk, the NMIP would defiantly seem more 
attractive than the MIA, 1906. The applicable law is however only one of 
many things taken into consideration when signing a policy of marine 
insurance. Nevertheless, the most reasonable for the insurance market as a 
whole would be to change the rules according to the suggestions laid 
forward by the Law Commission. The current MIA, 1906 was drafted to 
serve a market that was quite different from the present one and acting in a 
completely different environment.   
 
If the development in the UK may be major amendments, the trend in the 
Nordic market is harmonization and small adjustments. The latest version 
was the first on to which shipowners from all Nordic countries were 
signatory parties. The Plan itself did not see any noteworthy changes and no 
major revisions are expected in the foreseeable future.  
 
Finally, the fictional scenario presented in the first chapter will be 
commented. The insurer had in this case acted as expected when dealing 
with a seemingly good client. This is a typical example of when the duty of 
disclosure seems to be superfluous. However, the scenario shows that the 
duty of disclosure remain to be a fundamental guarantee as it protects the 
insurer from liability if any unexpected circumstance is exposed after the 
contract is concluded. The insurer shall not be punished for going beyond 
his legal obligations while assisting the assured on fulfilling the duty of 
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disclosure. Had the change of flag occurred during the contract period, he 
would have been protected by the rules of warranty/alteration of risk.   
 68 
Supplement A 
Relevant Sections of the MIA, 1906 
 
Section 17 Insurance is uberrimæ fidei.  
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the 
contract may be avoided by the other party. 
 
Section 18 Disclosure by assured.  
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to 
the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material 
circumstance which is known to the assured, and the assured is 
deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of 
business, ought to be known by him. If the assured fails to make 
such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract. 
(2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment 
of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether 
he will take the risk. 
(3) In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be 
disclosed, namely: 
(a) Any circumstance which diminishes the risk 
(b) Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known 
to the insurer. The insurer is presumed to know matters of 
common notoriety or knowledge, and matters which an 
insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought 
to know; 
(c) Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the 
insurer; 
(d) Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by 
reason of any express or implied warranty. 
(4) Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be 
material or not is, in each case, a question of fact. 
(5) The term “circumstance” includes any communication made to, or 
information received by, the assured. 
 
Section 20 Representations pending negotiation of contract 
(1) Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the 
insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and before the 
contract is concluded, must be true. If it be untrue the insurer may 
avoid the contract.  
(2) A representation is material which would influence the judgment of 
a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he 
will take the risk.  
(3) A representation may be either of a representation of as to a matter 
of fact, or as to a matter of expectation or belief. 
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(4) A representation as to a matter of fact is true, if it be substantially 
correct, that is to say, if the difference between what is represented 
and what is actually correct would not be considered material by a 
prudent insurer.  
(5) A representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true if it be 
made in good faith.  
(6) A representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract 
is concluded.  
(7) Whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each 
case, a question of fact.  
 
Section 84 Return for failure of consideration. 
(1) Where the consideration for the payment of the premium totally 
fails, and there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the 
assured or his agents, the premium is thereupon returnable to the 
assured. 
(2) Where the consideration for the payment of the premium is 
apportionable and there is a total failure of any apportionable part of 
the consideration, a proportionate part of the premium is, under the 
like conditions, thereupon returnable to the assured. 
(3) In particular - 
(a) Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer 
as from the commencement of the risk, the premium is 
returnable, provided that there has been no fraud or 
illegality on the part of the assured; but if the risk is not 
apportionable, and has once attached, the premium is 
not returnable: 
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Supplement B 
Relevant Sections of the NMIP, 2013  
 
Chapter 3 - Duties of the Person Effecting the Insurance 
and of the Assured 
 
Section 1. Duty of Disclosure of the Person Effecting the Insurance 
 
§ 3-1. Scope of the duty of disclosure 
The person effecting the insurance shall, at the time the contract is 
concluded, make full and correct disclosure of all circumstances that are 
material to the insurer when deciding whether and on what conditions he is 
prepared to accept the insurance.  
 
If the person effecting the insurance subsequently becomes aware that he 
has given incorrect or incomplete information regarding the risk, he shall 
without undue delay notify the insurer.  
 
§ 3-2. Fraudulent misrepresentation  
If the person effecting the insurance has fraudulently failed to fulfil his duty 
of disclosure, the contract is not binding on the insurer.  
 
The insurer may also cancel other contracts he has with the person effecting 
the insurance by giving fourteen days’ notice. 
 
§ 3-3. Other failure to fulfil the duty of disclosure 
If the person effecting the insurance has, at the time the contract is 
concluded, in any other way failed to fulfil his duty of disclosure, and it 
must be assumed that the insurer would not have accepted the insurance if 
the person effecting the insurance had made such disclosure as it was his 
duty to make, the contract is not binding on the insurer.  
 
If it must be assumed that the insurer would have accepted the insurance, 
but on other conditions, he shall only be liable to the extent that it is proved 
that the loss is not attributable to such circumstances as the person effecting 
the insurance should have disclosed. Liability is limited in the same manner 
if the person effecting the insurance has been in breach of the duty of 
disclosure after the contract was concluded, unless it is proved that the loss 
occurred before the person effecting the insurance was able to correct the 
information supplied by him.  
 
In the cases referred to in paragraph 2, the insurer may cancel the insurance 
by giving fourteen days’ notice.  
 
§ 3-4. Innocent breach of the duty of disclosure 
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If the person effecting the insurance has given incorrect or incomplete 
information without any blame attaching to him, the insurer is liable as if 
correct information had been given, but he may cancel the insurance by 
giving fourteen days’ notice.  
 
§ 3-5. Cases where the insurer may not invoke breach of the duty of 
disclosure 
The insurer may not plead that incorrect or incomplete information has been 
given if, at the time when the information should have been given, he knew 
or ought to have known of the matter. Nor may he invoke § 3-3 and § 3-4 if 
the circumstances about which incorrect or incomplete information was 
given have ceased to be material to him.  
 
§ 3-6. Duty of the insurer to give notice 
If the insurer becomes aware of the fact that incorrect or incomplete 
information has been given, he shall, without undue delay and in writing, 
notify the person effecting the insurance of the extent to which he intends to 
invoke § 3-2, § 3-3 and § 3-4. If he fails to do so, he forfeits his right to 
invoke those provisions.  
 
§ 3-7. Right of the insurer to obtain particulars from the ship’s 
classification society, etc. 
The person effecting the insurance shall, at the insurer’s request, provide 
him with all available particulars from the classification society concerning 
the condition of the ship before and during the insurance period.  
 
If the person effecting the insurance fails to fulfil his duty under paragraph 
1, the insurer may cancel the insurance by giving fourteen days’ notice, but 
with effect no earlier than on arrival of the ship at the nearest safe port, in 
accordance with the insurer’s instructions.  
 
The insurer is authorised to obtain information referred to in paragraph a 
directly from the classification society and from the relevant authorities in 
the country where the ship is registered or has been trough port-State 
control. The person effecting the insurance shall be notified no later than the 
time when the insurer seeks to obtain such information.  
 
Section 2. Alteration of the risk 
 
§ 3-8 Aleration of the risk 
An alteration of the risk occurs when there is a change in the circumstances 
which, according to the contract, are to form the basis of the insurance, and 
the risk is thereby altered contrary to the implied conditions of the contract.  
 
A change of the State of registration, of the manager of the ship or of the 
company which is responsible for the technical/maritime operation of the 
ship shall be deemed to be an alteration of the risk as defined by paragraph 
1. The same applies to a change of classification society.  
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§ 3-9. Alteration of the risk caused or agreed to by the assured 
If, after conclusion of the contract, the assured has intentionally caused or 
agreed to an alteration of the risk, the insurer is free from liability, provided 
that it may be assumed that he would not have accepted the insurance if, at 
the time the contract was concluded, he had known the alteration would take 
place.  
 
If it may be assumed that the insurer would have accepted the insurance, but 
on other conditions, he is only liable to the extent that the loss is proved not 
to be attributable to the alteration of the risk.  
 
§ 3-10. Right of the insurer to cancel the insurance 
If an alteration of the risk occurs, the insurer may cancel the insurance by 
giving fourteen days’ notice.  
 
§ 3-11. Duty of the assured to give notice 
If the assured becomes aware that an alteration of the risk will take place or 
has taken place, he shall without undue delay, notify the insurer. If the 
assured, without justifiable reason, fails to do so, the rule in § 3-9 shall 
apply, even if the alteration was not caused by him or took place without his 
consent, and the insurer may cancel the insurance by giving fourteen days’ 
notice.  
 
§ 3-12. Cases where the insurer may not invoke alteration of the risk 
The insurer may not invoke § 3-9 and § 3-10 after the alteration of the risk 
has ceased to be material to him.  
 
The same applies if the risk is altered by measures taken for the purpose of 
saving human life, or by the insured ship salvaging or attempting to salvage 
ship or goods during the voyage.   
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